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In order to stay both competitive and profitable it is essential for companies to adapt to the 
continuous changes in the environment and to adjust the firm’s strategy accordingly. Through-
out the years, scholars have investigated the importance of strategic change as well as the im-
pact that leadership can have on strategic change and thus firm performance. Additionally, the 
dynamic capabilities view that addresses the question of how firms can achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage in rapidly changing environments has gained increasing attention in re-
cent years.  
To demonstrate a real-life example of these theories, I developed a teaching case about the 
restructuring of Siemens. The case intends to demonstrate a strategic transformation of a major 
company in response to environmental changes, coming along with a new CEO. Joe Kaeser 
fundamentally reorganized the company and used in particular the digitalization trend to suc-
cessfully boost performance and restore success after a series of setbacks under the leadership 
of Siemens’ former CEO, Peter Loescher. The case clearly illustrates the importance of Sie-
mens’ dynamic capabilities for the transformation of the company and shows how especially 
the background and personality of the respective CEOs, Loescher first and then Kaeser, affected 
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De forma a permanecerem competitivas e lucrativas, é essencial que as empresas se adaptem 
às mudanças contínuas no ambiente externo e ajustem a sua estratégia em conformidade. Ao 
longo dos anos, vários autores investigaram a importância da mudança estratégica, bem como 
o impacto que a liderança pode ter na mudança estratégica e, portanto, no desempenho da 
empresa. Além disso, a framework das dynamic capabilities, que aborda a questão de como as 
empresas podem alcançar e sustentar uma vantagem competitiva em ambientes em rápida 
mudança, ganhou atenção crescente nos últimos anos. 
De forma a ilustrar com um exemplo real a aplicação dessas teorias, desenvolvi um caso de 
estudo sobre a reestruturação da Siemens. O caso demonstra a transformação estratégica de uma 
grande empresa em resposta a mudanças ambientais, ao mesmo tempo que é admitido um novo 
CEO. Joe Kaeser reorganizou profundamente a empresa e usou, em particular, a tendência da 
digitalização para melhorar a performance e restaurar o sucesso após uma série de contratempos 
sob a liderança do ex-CEO da Siemens, Peter Loescher. O caso ilustra claramente a importância 
das capacidades dinâmicas da Siemens para a transformação da empresa e mostra como, em 
particular, a experiência prévia e a personalidade dos respetivos CEOs, Loescher primeiro e 
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In order to remain competitive and stay profitable organizations are required to almost consist-
ently adapt to new environmental conditions and adjust their strategies since they are embedded 
to and are affected by institutional and market systems that steadily change. These exogenous 
shifts happen frequently and are diverse in their dimension (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000). 
Failing to timely respond to these changes can negatively affect a company’s performance and 
might even lead to its failure.  
For many years, scholars have investigated strategic change and the reasons behind it. Accord-
ing to Snow and Hambrick (1980) strategic change does not only include the modification of a 
company’s alignment with the environment, but also the implementation of several changes in 
different areas of the company coming along with it. It was found that poor organizational per-
formance is a major initiator of strategic change as it indicates a misalignment between the 
company and its environment (Boeker, 1997; Mintzberg, 1978). Regarding the effect of the 
CEO on strategic change Miller’s (1993) research has shown that CEO succession is often as-
sociated with organizational change. Building on that Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) argue that 
CEOs hired from inside the firm in contrast to outside CEOs typically implement changes that 
are more in line with the existing organizational capabilities and that benefit the firm perfor-
mance in a continuous way. In recent years especially the dynamic capabilities view, that is an 
extension of the resource-based theory, has gained increasing attention as it addresses the fun-
damental question of how firms can achieve and sustain competitive advantage in the context 
of changing environments (Barreto, 2010).  
This dissertation focuses on showing a real-life example of a major company that carries out a 
restructuring in order to adapt to the changing environment. It is the aim of this thesis to under-
stand how Joe Kaeser, the current CEO of Siemens, fundamentally reorganized the company 
and used in particular the ongoing digitalization trend, that is known as one of the main drivers 
behind business adaptations in today’s world (Roland Berger, 2018), as an opportunity to boost 
performance and restore success after a series of setbacks under the leadership of Siemens’ 
former CEO, Peter Loescher. In form of a case study this thesis will provide explanatory exam-
ination of the importance of dynamic capabilities for the success of a company, that is operating 
in a dynamic environment, as well as the effect leadership can have on strategic change and 
firm performance.  
This thesis is divided into five different chapters. Following the introduction, the first section 
will cover the Literature Review, which provides an overview of the existing literature to set a 
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theoretical framework to sustain the analysis. As part of it, the concepts of strategic change, the 
impact of the CEO on strategic change and firm performance as well as the concept of dynamic 
capabilities are investigated. The next chapter will be the main part of this thesis, which will be 
the Teaching Case about the restructuring at Siemens. The third chapter will include the respec-
tive Teaching Notes for this case, which provide some guidance as to how the case can be used 
in class. Conclusively, this thesis will end with a Discussion and Conclusion.  
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2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter of the thesis presents an extensive literature review with the purpose of setting a 
theoretical framework to sustain the following case study. In this respect, the chapter gathers, 
contrasts and evaluates the existing academic literature. As part of it, three theoretical topics 
will be explored in more detail, including strategic change, the impact of the CEO on strategic 
change and firm performance, as well as the concept of dynamic capabilities.  
 
2.1. Strategic Change  
 
In the academic literature many diverse definitions of a company’s strategy as well as strategic 
change can be found. One of the first definitions of strategy was provided by Chandler (1962, 
p. 13) who describes it as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals.” He argues that organizations should first identify the general objec-
tive of the enterprise and could then determine the most appropriate organizational structure in 
order to achieve this. Another definition was formulated by Mintzberg (1978) who focuses more 
on the decision-making process of strategies and interpreted strategy as a pattern of decisions 
about the organization’s future. He defines strategy as “the set of consistent behaviors by which 
the organization establishes for a time its place in its environment” (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 941). 
According to Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser (2000, p. 429) the appropriateness of a company’s 
strategy can be determined by “its fit , match, or congruence with the environment or organiza-
tional contingencies facing the firm.” However, environmental changes in the competitive, 
technological, social, and legal conditions may cause the ineffectiveness of a prior strategy. In 
order to restore the alignment with the new environmental conditions, organizations must an-
ticipate environmental shifts and initiate strategic change (Audia et al., 2000). To maintain the 
current strategy and keep up with the status quo can only be beneficial if the firm’s current 
strategy is successful and the company operates in a stable industry and economic environment 
(Haynes & Hillman, 2010).  
Building on that, Mintzberg (1978, p. 941) views strategic change “as the organization's re-
sponse to environmental change, constrained by the momentum of the bureaucracy and accel-
erated or dampened by the leadership.” In contrast to this rather process-oriented definition 
Snow and Hambrick (1980, p. 529) use a more outcome-oriented perspective and define 
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strategic change as follows: “Strategic change occurs only when the organization (1) modifies 
in a major way its alignment with the environment and (2) substantially alters technology, struc-
ture, and process to fit the new alignment.” Accordingly, from their point of view strategic 
change involves process changes as well as alterations in technology and structure which are 
important to come up with a new strategic direction. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, p. 433) even 
go further and argue that strategic change involves “an attempt to alter the current way of think-
ing and acting by the organization's membership.” From their perspective, strategic transfor-
mation is not only about adapting the way of acting but does also imply changes in the current 
modes of cognition and thinking.  
Regarding the reasons for strategic change, many scholars support the view that a poor organi-
zational performance mainly initiates strategic change as it can be seen as an indicator for a 
misalignment between the company’s current strategy and its environment, and therefore cre-
ates the necessity for strategic change (Boeker, 1997; Mintzberg, 1978). However, research of 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) has shown that strategic change is not necessarily induced by a 
declining performance and a crisis. It rather aims at maintaining a company’s viability in the 
long term under changing environmental conditions. As part of the same study, they argue that 
strategic changes without crisis might be more strenuous to implement and face more resistance 
as poor organizational performance can legitimate changes whose implementation might be 
difficult otherwise.  
Further research has shown, that depending on the level of strategic change the effect of strate-
gic transformations on firm performance can be different. As part of their research, Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2010) found that the level of strategic change has an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship with firm performance. They argue that slight to moderate changes increase the firm per-
formance, while moderate to great changes lead to a decline in performance. These results stress 









2.2. The impact of the CEO on strategic change and firm performance 
 
In the academic literature most authors agree that strategic leaders have a crucial impact on firm 
performance. Hambrick (1989) points out that in order to understand why organizations per-
form the way they do, the people at the top, most notably the CEO, must be examined as they 
account for what happens to the organization. According to Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, p. 433) 
the CEO of an organization can be characterized “as someone who has primary responsibility 
for setting strategic directions and plans for the organization, as well as responsibility for guid-
ing actions that will realize those plans.” Also Weiner and Mahoney (1981) have found leader-
ship to be a relevant explanatory variable for organizational performance. They suggest that 
organizational performance is determined by a function of influences, organizational character-
istics as well as the choices of organizational leaders. Accordingly, in addition to company 
specific and environmental factors, it is the behavior and the strategic choices of the organiza-
tional leader that affect organizational performance and “that may make the difference between 
organizational success or failure” (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981, p. 456). However, some authors 
contradict the existence of a relevant relationship between leadership and corporate perfor-
mance, as they assert that executive leadership is an inconsequential determinant of organiza-
tional performance. In their paper Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich (1985) argue that the impact 
of leadership has been widely overstated and romanticized. They state that people tend to at-
tribute variance in organizational performance to a single person, as this is an easier explanation 
than trying to understand the complex processes that caused the observed variance in organiza-
tional performance. This argumentation of Meindl et al. (1985) was criticized by Day and Lord 
(1988) as they argue that the data Meindl et al. (1985) base their conclusions on was misinter-
preted and not analyzed in a methodologically sound way. Day and Lord (1988) concluded that 
when results are properly interpreted and several methodological concerns are addressed, ex-
ecutive leadership can explain as much as 45 % of an organization’s performance.  
Regarding the effect of the CEO on strategic change, top executives are generally portrayed as 
playing a dominant role in formulating corporate strategy and determining the strategic direc-
tion of the firm (Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). According to Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, 
p. 446) “[t]he CEO (and ultimately the top management team) can be seen as architects, assim-
ilators, and facilitators of strategic change.” They support the view that while implementing 
change, the CEO also has a symbolic role that especially implies making sense of, and giving 
sense about, the interpretation of a new vision for the institution and convincing the 
6 
 
organizational stakeholders of the change (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Westphal and Fredrick-
son (2001) argue that the content and direction of the strategic change the CEO takes is pre-
dicted by previous experiences and personal backgrounds. In addition, with respect to the re-
sults of strategic change Thomas and Ramaswamy (1996), building on the concept of Miles, 
Snow, Meyer, and Coleman (1978), show that firms that can achieve an alignment between 
managerial characteristics and strategic direction perform better than firms where such an align-
ment is missing. This again provides strong evidence about the impact that an organization’s 
leader exerts in driving performance.  
Over the past decades, scholars have also addressed the question, whether the change of the 
CEO has an effect on strategic change and firm performance. On the one hand, research results 
have shown that CEO succession is associated with organizational change as “new CEOs are 
more likely than their predecessors to disperse power and to process more information in re-
sponse to poor performance” (Miller, 1993, p. 656). In contrast to this, as part of his study 
Boeker (1997) found evidence that CEO tenure had a significant effect on strategic change and 
therefore can be seen as an important predictor of strategic change, whereas chief execution 
succession apparently had no significant effect. Consistent with Miller’s (1993) argumentation 
also Westphal and Fredrickson (2001, p. 1131) argue that the initiation of change is mainly 
considered during leader succession as “[t]he departure of the CEO may leave a power vacuum 
that enables board members to assert their strategic preferences by selecting new CEOs from 
outside the organization who have experience with the strategy that board members favor.” This 
argumentation also supports the fact that especially CEOs hired from outside the organization 
initiate change and define the new direction for the organization, as identified by Greiner and 
Bhambri (1989). According to Westphal and Fredrickson (2001), directors who favor strategic 
change should select outside successors who have experience with their preferred strategy in 
contrast to insiders who have experience with the current strategy. However, Zhang and Ra-
jagopalan (2010) found evidence that CEOs hired from inside the firm in contrast to outsiders 
are more likely to introduce and implement strategic changes that are in line with the existing 
capabilities of the organization since they have a better understanding of the firm. Thus, changes 
of the strategy initiated by CEOs coming from inside the firm “tend to benefit firm performance 





2.3. Dynamic Capabilities  
 
The field of strategic management has always been interested in understanding how firms 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). An 
influential theoretical framework used to understand this question is the resource-based view 
(RBV). It focuses on the internal organization of firms, assuming that a firm’s bundle of re-
sources and capabilities is the main source of achieving sustainable competitive advantage by 
implementing value-creating strategies that are difficult to imitate by competitors (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000). The RBV supposes that these resources and capabilities are heterogeneously 
distributed across firms, and thus particular to a firm (Barney, 1991). As long as they are valu-
able and rare as well as costly to imitate and non-substitutable they can provide sustainable 
competitive advantage to a firm (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, the RBV was criticized 
for being inadequate to explain a firm’s competitive advantage in situations of changing envi-
ronments as the RBV is fundamentally static in its nature (Barreto, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). To overcome that limitation, Teece et al. (1997) were the first scholars who introduced 
the concept of dynamic capabilities as an extension of the RBV. After the publication of Teece 
et al. (1997), the dynamic capabilities view has gathered increasing attention in the management 
literature leading to a flow of research and diverse definitions that vary significantly in terms 
of the nature, specific role, relevant context, creation and development mechanisms, heteroge-
neity assumptions, types of outcomes, as well as purpose of dynamic capabilities (Barreto, 
2010). 
Teece et al. (1997, p. 516) first defined dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environ-
ments.” In contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000, p. 1107) do not see dynamic capabilities as 
abilities but rather as “[t]he firm’s processes that use resources - specifically the processes to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain, and release resources - to match and even create market change; 
dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve 
new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die.” From their point 
of view, dynamic capabilities are not only relevant in highly dynamic markets as suggested by 
Teece et al. (1997), but also in moderately dynamic ones. Zollo and Winter (2002) even go 
further and state that dynamic capabilities are also used in environments characterized by lower 
rates of change. They describe a dynamic capability as “a learned and stable pattern of collective 
activity through which the organization systematically generates and modifies its operating 
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routines in pursuit of improved effectiveness” (Zollo & Winter, 2002, p. 340) highlighting the 
fact that dynamic capabilities are structured and persistent. From their perspective, dynamic 
capabilities are not a disjointed way to respond to crisis, but rather stable activities to improve 
effectiveness.  
As the immense growth of research lead to a proliferation of definitions as well as the emer-
gence of a complex and disconnected body of research, Barreto (2010) introduced a new con-
cept of dynamic capabilities as an aggregate multidimensional construct to address some of the 
limitations of other definitions. Drawing on past research of dynamic capabilities, he defines a 
dynamic capability as “the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its pro-
pensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and 
to change its resource base” (Barreto, 2010, p. 271). Accordingly, the four dimensions – pro-
pensity to sense opportunities and threats, propensity to make timely decisions, propensity to 
make market-oriented decisions and propensity to change its resource base – represent the con-
cept of dynamic capabilities and should be taken into account for the construct. This multidi-
mensional construct avoids framing the concept in a dichotomous way and allows different 
firms to have different levels of dynamic capabilities as there can be a low or high potential 




3 Teaching Case 
 
Rebuilding Siemens for the digital age  
 
“If you want to set the course, you can’t be guided by what others have done. You’ve got to 
anticipate changes and seize the opportunities they provide.”1 
 
– Joe Kaeser, President and CEO, Siemens AG 
It was Friday morning, November 2, 2018. Joe Kaeser entered his office in the headquarters of 
Siemens AG in Munich, Germany, thinking about the pending appointments of the day. It was 
exactly three months ago that he had announced the new strategic program, Vision 2020+, that 
should set the future course for Siemens even after his tenure that would end in 2021.2 Already 
one month ago the new structure went into effect and Siemens was on track with the execution 
of the new strategic plan. Later that day, he would have a meeting with the Supervisory Board 
to discuss how to further proceed with the implementation of the new changes. Kaeser started 
to think about the past and how the announcement of the new strategic plan was received by 
the public three months ago. On the one hand he got support for the ongoing strategic develop-
ment and Vision 2020+ was seen as an outstanding concept that would enable Siemens to rap-
idly develop from a position of strength and prepare it for the next decade.3 But on the other 
hand, rumors arose that the new strategic plan would involve the cut of further 20,000 jobs.4 It 
has already happened several times during his tenure that Kaeser was criticized for placing too 
much value on capital markets and cutting jobs although the company registered profits in the 
billions.5  
Kaeser leaned back on his chair and questioned himself: What have I achieved since I replaced 
Peter Loescher five years ago? Have I implemented the right strategic changes? And how did 
these changes affect the firm performance?  
 
 
Background of Siemens 
 
Siemens has a history that goes way back to 1847 when Werner von Siemens and his partner 
Johann Georg Halske founded Telegraphen-Bauanstalt von Siemens & Halske in Berlin.6 Since 
then Siemens has served as an impressive innovation and technology force. Over its history 
Siemens came up with several innovative inventions that immensely shaped the technological 
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evolution of the world7, such as the first pointer telegraph in 1847, the first dynamo in 1866 and 
the first magnetic resonance imaging scanner in 19838.  
From the very beginning, Werner von Siemens aspired to market his innovations not just in 
Germany but also internationally. Envisioning a global enterprise, he opened the company’s 
first representative office in London in 1850 and expanded his business eastward to begin the 
construction of the Russian telegraph network just three years later.9 Further international ac-
tivities followed in the next years so that in more than 170 years, Siemens has grown from a 
simple startup in Berlin to a global player that operates in more than 200 countries.10 Through-
out its history Siemens has enjoyed phases of great success but has also proven the strength to 
survive business failures as well as economic downswings and social changes.11 
Since 2013 the business development, as well as success of Siemens, have been primarily 
shaped by its CEO, Joe Kaeser, who successfully lead Siemens into the digital age and returned 
the company to its former glory after a series of setbacks under the leadership of its former 
CEO, Peter Loescher. Focusing on the areas of electrification, automation and digitalization 
Kaeser developed Siemens into a global powerhouse that is positioned along the electrification 
value chain - from power generation, transmission and distribution to smart grid solutions and 




The era of Peter Loescher (2007-2013) 
 
Peter Loescher was appointed as CEO of Siemens AG in July 2007. He was the first outside 
CEO of Siemens since its founding in 1847 by the German inventor Werner von Siemens13 and 
largely unknown in Germany prior to his tenure at Siemens14. He was a native of Austria and 
studied economics at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong. He hold an MBA degree from Vienna University and graduated from 
the Advanced Management Program at Harvard Business School.15 After studying economics 
and business, Loescher began his professional career at the consulting firm Kienbaum und Part-
ner and worked later for the German chemicals and life sciences company Hoechst as well as 
the British life sciences company Amersham plc. After Amersham was acquired by General 
Electric (GE), he joined GE’s Executive Board and was appointed President and CEO of the 
company’s healthcare sector. Prior to joining Siemens, he served as a member of the Executive 
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Committee and President of Global Human Health at the pharmaceuticals company Merck & 
Co.16 
 
The first years of his tenure 
When Peter Loescher was appointed as CEO in 2007, Siemens highly suffered from the conse-
quences of one of the greatest corporate scandals in German business history.17 In 2006 Siemens 
faced widespread corruption and bribery allegations after investigations of the German state 
attorney’s office disclosed an amount of more than € 2.3 billion of suspicious payments to for-
eign governments.18 It turned out that Siemens had bribed governmental officials, as well as 
private business people, in several countries such as China, Russia, Argentina, Israel and Ven-
ezuela to win contracts and to gain favorable conditions over more than three decades.19 The 
shock was particularly deep since prior to the corruption scandal Siemens was considered a 
model company in Germany as it was renowned for its innovative technological products and 
reliable services.20 However, it was proven that for many years Siemens pretended to do busi-
ness according to the highest ethical and legal standards, but the reality looked completely dif-
ferent. 
Consequently, when Loescher became CEO of Siemens in 2007, he was faced with a great 
challenge. At the beginning of his tenure, it was his main task to root-out bribery, clean-up the 
company and re-establish trust in corporate policy. Loescher believed that Siemens made the 
right choice to hire an outside CEO. The company was down on its knees due to the corruption 
scandal, so that a CEO was needed who was absolutely clean to resolve the situation and drive 
fundamental change.21 In his first term as CEO, between 2007 and 2012, Loescher successfully 
guided Siemens through this very challenging period, first marked by the consequences of the 
corruption scandal and later by the global financial and debt crisis.22 He won much praise as 
under his leadership Siemens substantially improved its performance and profitability so that 
his contract was extended by five years until 2017 in 2012.23  
 
A culture of integrity  
To rebuild trust in his company after the involvement in the bribery scandal, Loescher not only 
collaborated with state authorities to reveal all details of the bribery scandal and replaced the 
old management in cases where there was suspicion that they had been involved in the bribery 
affair or had tolerated the corrupt practices24, but also renewed the organization’s culture fo-
cusing on integrity as a cultural value. The first actions undertaken by Loescher included an 
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open communication about the former problems and the way in which they should be addressed 
in the future. As part of it, Loescher launched a 100-day tour around the world to be visible and 
to meet with employees and clients in order to listen to them.25 It was his aim to terminate the 
corrupt culture as fast as possible.26 
In the years following the scandal the Siemens management reformulated the company’s gen-
eral code of ethics and implemented various new codes of conduct concerning, among others, 
new regulations for donations, financial affairs and its environmental standards.27 To inform its 
employees about the new organizational rules and to sensitize them to the problems accompa-
nying corrupt behavior, Siemens initiated several training programs for employees and manag-
ers.28 Aiming at establishing new values at Siemens, the new educational trainings were seen 
as one of the most important levers for fostering cultural change among employees. Further-
more, Loescher strengthened the internal monitoring of Siemens. He established a new compli-
ance committee at the Supervisory Board to monitor the new anticorruption policy and em-
ployed about 500 people in the compliance office to terminate the corrupt culture.29 Addition-
ally, ethics hotlines and “help-desks” were installed to assists managers in the decision-making 
process and to give employees the opportunity to anonymously report code violations if there 
was a case of suspicion.30 With the slogan “only clean business is Siemens business” Loescher 
tried to establish a new sense of awareness about corruption and to appeal to the communal 
spirit of the Siemens employees.31  
Although Siemens was involved in one of the biggest bribery scandals in Germany, its actions 
to rebuild corporate reputation under the leadership of Loescher were not only seen as an ex-
ample of best-practice by the European Commission32 but also gained increasing attention in 
the corporate world. Overall, compared to Siemens no other company has acted under compa-
rable circumstances and pressure and has invested that much in compliance. Therefore, at this 
time the leading role of Siemens in the setting of compliance standards and fighting corruption 
was generally accepted.33  
 
Siemens’ strategic direction and organizational structure under Loescher 
In 2005 Loeschers predecessor, Klaus Kleinfeld, gave Siemens a new orientation and ordered a 
change in focus to the megatrends of urbanization, demographic change and climate change. 
Loescher followed this strategic direction and incorporated it into Siemens’ organizational 
structure in 2008 (see Exhibit 1).34 In this context, the businesses of Siemens were reorganized 
and the operations were grouped into three sectors, Industry, Energy and Healthcare, consisting 
of 15 divisions in total.35 Also, the structure of the Board was changed and a new executive 
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leadership model introduced. As part of it, the number of members of the Managing Board was 
reduced from eleven to eight and the Corporate Executive Committee of the Managing Board 
was eliminated.36 While the former centralized Board had no direct responsibilities for the op-
erative business, these responsibilities were now assigned to single Board members. Each mem-
ber of the Managing Board headed a clearly defined chain of command with unambiguous es-
calation paths. With this new organizational structure, it was Loescher’s aim to simplify struc-
tures, clarify respective responsibilities and accelerate decision-making.37  
After three years in the top spot, Loescher also focused on sustainable infrastructure and green 
technology - ensuring Siemens did not miss the opportunity to get a spot at the table when it 
comes to green initiatives.38 In 2011 Loescher added the sector Infrastructure and Cities to the 
organizational structure which mainly included products and services for green cities. Loescher 
believed that there was enormous growth potential in this area as the biggest 600 cities made 
up half of the global economic output.39 To take advantage of this business opportunity, Sie-
mens developed the so called “Green-City-Index” that revealed the strengths and weaknesses 
of cities and emphasized the role of Siemens as a solutions provider.40 Furthermore, Loescher 
made major investments in renewable energy such as solar power plants. As an example, in 
2009 Siemens acquired Israel’s Solel Solar and purchased a stake in Archimede Solar Energy, 
an Italian solar thermal specialist.41 
Throughout his tenure Loescher was known for setting ambiguous objectives in growth and 
cost savings for Siemens.42 It was his aim to become a global leader, not only in technology but 
also in earning power.43 To achieve this goal and to strengthen the global competitiveness, he 
set up a target system, the so called “One Siemens” that defined metrics for revenue growth, 
capital efficiency, profitability and the optimization of the capital structure in 2010.44  
 
When criticism mounted  
It all seemed to go pretty well for Loescher. He successfully guided Siemens through the chal-
lenges of the bribery scandal and the financial crash in 2008.45 However, in the upcoming years 
the performance reached a turning point. The success of Siemens was clouded by a series of 
mishaps and setbacks as well as managerial decisions that later turned out to be a mistake so 
that criticism over Loescher mounted.  
Many people did not see in Loescher a strong entrepreneurial leader.46 Under his leadership 
Siemens evolved into a plaything of financial interests and vain managers47 – and that was 
partly down to Loescher’s shortcomings. He was constantly travelling to clinch an export deal 
and always in touch with governments so that he could be rather seen as the company's chief 
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lobbyist than the big playmaker the company had hoped for. He never worked himself deeply 
enough into issues. In contrast, the chief executive relied on his sector heads and left a lot of 
responsibilities up to them.48 Loescher was highly criticized for not defining a long-term vision 
for the company. Based on the financial results it was evident that Siemens did not make any 
progress. The company was losing its profitability and competitiveness, and its innovativeness 
in particular. But the Management Board under Loescher took no action.49  
Also, the new organizational structure implemented by Loescher fell short of expectations. He 
gambled away much money with the purchase and sale of company shares that later turned out 
to be mistaken investments.50 In particular, this has been the case in the solar business where 
due to changed regulatory conditions, lower growth and strong price pressure in the market, the 
company’s expectations could not be met. As a consequence, in 2013 the solar power division 
of Siemens, which lost €1 billion, had to be shut down.51 
Even the investments in the new sector Infrastructure and Cities that was mainly addressed to 
growing megacities have been unsuccessful as in the course of the financial crisis the cities and 
their governments suffered from a lack of money.52  
In the first term of his tenure, Loescher successfully trimmed down the company and boosted 
efficiency. But this success did not last because of no discernible vision behind it and as it was 
purely driven by costs and figures, at the expense of the workforce as many jobs were cut.53 It 
was said that since he was the first outside CEO of Siemens, he could neither connect to Sie-
mens nor to the overall workforce during his time as CEO.54  
The financial situation of Siemens was even made worse by a series of business mishaps that 
were putting Siemens’ technological reputation at risk and cost Siemens a fortune in fines.55 In 
2013 Siemens did not only have difficulties to connect North Sea wind parks to the electricity 
grid, but also delayed delivery of 16 urgently needed high-speed ICE trains to rail operator 
Deutsche Bahn.56 Initially, the trains with a value of € 3.7 billion were expected to be completed 
in 2011. But because of electronic problems the trains could not be delivered before 2014.57  
However, it appeared that the biggest mistake of Loescher was the missed profit margin target 
in July 2013. Already in 2011, he was accused of misjudging market developments with his 
goal of expanding sales by almost a quarter to €100 billion.58 He then set an ambitious profit-
margin goal of 12 % by 2014, up from 9.6 % in 2012. In July 2013 it was clear that this target 
could not be reached so that the forecast had to be adjusted downward.59  
As a consequence of the precarious situation Peter Loescher was fired by the Supervisory Board 
and replaced by Joe Kaeser.60 Loescher left Siemens with a smaller market value when he was 
removed (€83 billion) than when he arrived in 2007 (€103 billion).61 
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New leadership – strategic change under Kaeser 
 
When Joe Kaeser replaced Peter Loescher as CEO on October 1, 2013, there was great hope 
that Siemens would return to “calm waters” under his leadership.62 However, many people be-
lieved that Kaeser was the right successor and could manage to bring the old success of Siemens 
back.  
Contrary to Loescher, Kaeser was an inside CEO who has never worked for a different com-
pany. After his studies in Business Administration at the University of Applied Sciences Re-
gensburg, he directly started his career at Siemens in 1980 and was lately the Chief Financial 
Officer.63 During his time at Siemens Kaeser has earned a reputation as a hands-on pragmatist 
and was seen as having an understanding of Siemens' business and culture that Loescher has 
always been felt to lack.64 He did not only have a good relationship to investors and the capital 
market65, but also went down well with people in general. While Kaeser was known for being 




To restore Siemens to its old glory and gear the company to the future, Kaeser saw the necessity 
to create an entrepreneurial concept aimed at strengthening Siemens and achieving profitable 
growth in the long term. He did not want to focus on the next one or two quarters or the next 
reporting season but on the years and, perhaps, even decades to come.67  
In May 2014 he introduced the so-called Vision 2020. It was a huge reorganization plan that 
should enable Siemens to consistently occupy attractive growth fields, sustainably strengthen 
the core business and outpace its competitors in efficiency and performance.68 For Kaeser it 
was the path to a successful future. He hardly left anything of the Siemens structure under 
Loescher.69 
The company-wide reorganization should be implemented in three phases.70 It was the first task 
to boost performance by focusing on business excellence. Kaeser wanted to get even those 
businesses that were not reaching their full potential back on the track and make them compet-
itive again.71  
In the medium term, it was the aim to strengthen the core business. According to Kaeser, it was 
important to focus on the things that made Siemens strong and put other things aside to achieve 
long-term success. To reach this aim, Siemens should allocate resources in a more rigorous way 
in order to expand in strategic growth fields.72 
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Last but not least, in the long-term Kaeser wanted to scale up the company. Siemens should 
intensify its efforts to seize further growth opportunities and tap new promising fields in the 
future.73 
To measure the progress of Siemens’ reorganization, the success of Vision 2020 was linked to 
the attainment of seven overarching goals (see Exhibit 4).74 In addition, the original “One Sie-
mens” financial concept was further expanded to make it a comprehensive management model 
encompassing the overarching goals and priorities with which the new strategy should be im-
plemented throughout the company.75  
 
A clear mission statement  
When Kaeser rethought the company’s purpose, and why it actually existed, he clearly saw the 
need for defining a clear mission statement for Siemens. For him a clear mission was important 
for a successful future as it expresses the company’s self-understanding and defines its aspira-
tions.76 As part of Vision 2020, he announced the following mission to its employees: 
“We make real what matters by setting the benchmark in the way we electrify, automate and 
digitalize the world around us. Ingenuity drives us and what we create is yours. Together we 
deliver.”77 
 
With this mission Kaeser emphasized that by partnering with Siemens’ customers he not only 
wanted to improve people’s lives today, but also in the generations to come. According to Kae-
ser, it was his goal and at the same time responsibility, to shape the future and leverage sustain-
able business practice in cooperation with its partners. Furthermore, he wanted to set bench-
marks by using Siemens’ power of innovation, its leading technologies, its global presence as 
well as its financial solidity.78  
He saw this mission as the foundation on which Siemens has been tackling the challenges of 
the time ever since it was founded by Werner von Siemens more than 170 years ago. And it 
should also make Siemens successful in the future.79 
 
Strategic direction and positioning  
According to Kaeser the reorganization of Siemens was mainly prompted by two developments. 
First, Siemens has not lived up to its economic potential in the last years and was therefore 
lagging behind its competitors as they were growing faster and achieving higher profit margins. 
Second, the progressive digitalization fundamentally transformed and affected all aspects of the 
economy and society, and thus Siemens as well. Siemens was facing forays into its domain by 
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software companies like SAP, Microsoft, IBM as well as players like Google and Apple, as 
these new competitors started to enter new markets such as in the area of manufacturing and 
building technologies.80 Kaeser’s answer to that threat of new entrants was the positioning of 
Siemens along the electrification value chain. He wanted to align the portfolio of Siemens to 
the areas of electrification, automation and digitalization.81 For many years, Siemens had been 
focusing on the megatrends of urbanization, demographic change, globalization and climate 
change. With the emerging megatrend of digitalization, Siemens also wanted to play a key role 
in shaping the digital transformation in the future, as Kaeser saw digitalization as the key driver 
for industrial growth.82  
From the very beginning, Siemens has been an electrification company and has achieved to 
become a major player in the field of automation over the years. For Kaeser it was clear that if 
Siemens wanted to be successful in the future, it was essential to also master digitalization and 
to use it to create value for customers.83  
The new set up should help Siemens to close the gap between its competitors and make Siemens 
strong again. With the aim of creating sustainable value for its employees, customers and share-
holders, Kaeser highly increased the investments in R&D and market access (see Exhibit 5).84 
Furthermore, in October 2016 a separate unit for startups, the next47, was set up to foster dis-
ruptive ideas more vigorously and to accelerate the development of new technologies.85 
 
Organizational structure 
Kaeser also wanted to reflect the new strategic direction of Siemens in the company’s organi-
zation (see Exhibit 2). As a first step, he removed layers from the organizational structure to 
bring the business closer to customers and key markets. As part of it, the 14 Regional Clusters 
were replaced by 30 Lead Countries that generated more than 85% of the business and should 
now report directly to the Managing Board.86  
In addition, the sector level was eliminated and the business activities were bundled into nine 
divisions. With this new organization, Siemens hoped to reduce complexity and bureaucracy, 
cut costs, as well as to make the company more customer-oriented by speeding up decision- 
making processes. In the future, a stringent governance should make sure that Siemens’ meth-
odologies to continuously improve performance were rigorously applied company-wide in all 
Siemens businesses and projects.87 
In order to adapt to the digitalization trend, Kaeser dedicated a division solely to the Digital 
Factory, offering a comprehensive portfolio of seamlessly integrated hardware, software and 
technology-based services. Since Siemens was the first company to bundle all the requirements 
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for the factory of the future under one roof, Kaeser believed that this division would be Sie-
mens’ main driving force for the much discussed Fourth Revolution in which every aspect of 
production - from idea, development and manufacturing to services and recycling - would be 
totally integrated.88  
As part of the new organization it was further announced that the Healthcare sector would be 
managed independently in the future. This would provide greater flexibility required for the 
volatile healthcare markets and technologies and therefore give them better prospects for the 
future.89  
Furthermore, Kaeser substantially strengthened the international organization of Siemens. In 
view of the growing strategic importance of the U.S. energy markets, Kaeser relocated the man-
agement of the energy business as well as the responsibility for supporting Siemens’ marketing 
activities throughout America to Houston, Texas. 90 
However, the reorganization highly affected the workforce of Siemens. In February 2015 Kae-
ser announced 7,800 jobs were to be cut worldwide as part of the streamlining of administrative 
and overhead functions.91 Further job cuts followed in the subsequent years (see Exhibit 6). In 
addition, with the ongoing reorganization also the structure of the workforce was changed. 
While Siemens used to primarily hire engineers and physicists, Siemens started to mainly re-
cruit software specialists for new positions especially in the development department. Already 
in 2016 around 5 % of the Siemens employees worked as software developers.92  
 
Acquisitions, divestments and partnerships  
To sharpen the business focus in electrification, automation and digitalization, Siemens con-
stantly developed its portfolio with determination under the leadership of Kaeser. In the me-
dium term it was Kaeser’s aim to strengthen the core business and to divest activities that yield 
few or no synergies for the company.93 The first steps were taken with the acquisitions of Rolls-
Royce’s aero-derivative gas turbine business in 201494 and the decision to acquire U.S. com-
pressor and turbine manufacturer Dresser-Rand in 201595. The two acquisitions closed im-
portant gaps in the electrification portfolio for the oil and gas industry as well as for decentral-
ized power generation.96 Also, the sale of the audiology business97 and the divestment of the 
stake in BSH Bosch and Siemens Hausgeräte98, the joint venture focusing on household appli-
ances, that were both finalized in 2014, were further signals that Siemens was intent on imple-
menting its Vision 2020.  
Additionally, Siemens used acquisitions and partnerships in a great extent to broaden its digital 
capabilities under Kaeser. With the acquisition of leading software specialists such as Mentor 
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Graphics in 201799 as well as J2 Innovations100 and Mendix in 2018101 Siemens complemented 
its growing digital portfolio and strengthened its position as a leading driver in digital transfor-
mation. 
Furthermore, several partnerships were set up in the field of digitalization. For instance, a co-
operation with IBM in 2016 enabled Siemens to integrate new analytics tools into the digitali-
zation platform MindSphere, the cloud-based Siemens operating system for the Internet of 
Things, which was seen as a key element in the Vision 2020's innovation strategy.102  
 
The ownership culture  
According to Kaeser, it was not only the corporate strategy that made the difference but also 
the company’s values and what the company stands for. Accordingly, he saw a strong culture 
as the most important engine of long-term success and sustainable business as it forms the origin 
and foundation of all considerations in the company.103  
To support the concept of Vision 2020, Kaeser initiated a fundamental culture change at Sie-
mens - a change toward a true ownership culture, the kind of culture typically lived by well-run 
family businesses.104 With the motto “Always act as if it were your own company” he encour-
aged every employee, from Managing Board member to trainee, to take personal responsibility 
and give his or her best in his or her position in order to help building Siemens’ long-term 
success.105  
He believed that the following five principles were especially important for a successful own-
ership culture:106  
First of all, he supported a modern understanding of leadership. He expected managers to serve 
as role models for the company’s strategic direction, to act like entrepreneurs and to inspire and 
empower employees to give their best for the company.107 Second, ownership culture meant 
employee orientation. That involved communicating management decisions transparently, en-
couraging employees to ask questions, promoting an open dialogue, and standing by employees 
and fostering collaboration in good as well as bad times.108 Third, with an employee stock plan 
Kaeser wanted to turn more and more Siemens employees into Siemens shareholders to enable 
them to profit from the company’s success. He was convinced that employee shareholders were 
more motivated and committed because they directly participated in “their” company’s suc-
cess.109 As the first employee profit-sharing program at Siemens was already introduced back 
in 1858, the equity culture has already had a long tradition at Siemens.110 However, Kaeser saw 
the need to further strengthen and extend the equity culture. In 2014 144,000 Siemens employ-
ees were shareholders. By 2020, it was his aim to increase this number by at least 50 % to 
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around 200,000.111 Fourth, Siemens’ values “responsible, excellent, innovative” were supposed 
to be the foundation of the ownership culture. From Kaeser’s perspective, only companies that 
act responsibly could produce excellent results and be innovative in the long-run.112 Last but 
not least, the fifth principle was about promoting entrepreneurial behavior in order to bring the 
ownership culture to life. He encouraged employees to think and act as an entrepreneur, to seek 
and seize opportunities rather than always staying inside the own comfort zone and to always 
focus on what creates value for customers and society.113  
The ownership culture turned out to be a great success factor. In April 2018 80 % of all Siemens 
employees worldwide were Siemens shareholders. In total, around 300,000 of the company's 
377,000 employees worldwide hold Siemens shares. Siemens has exceeded the target of around 
200,000 employee shareholders in 2020 by a clear margin.114  
 
Siemens in the end of 2018  
When Vision 2020 was presented by Kaeser in 2014, Siemens was not exactly in great shape - 
neither strategically, nor operationally, and certainly not from the point of view of business 
leadership.115 However, the implemented strategy program helped to bring growth back to Sie-
mens. In particular fiscal 2018 was a successful year as Siemens was in better shape than 
ever.116 The forecast for the year that was even revised upward at mid-year was met at every 
single point.117 The company had lean structures, delivered reliable and good products, stood 
out with high earning power and was ahead of time in many areas.118 Kaeser believed that 
especially the record order backlog of €132 billion would provide a solid foundation for the 
next fiscal year.119 
Furthermore, the goals of Vision 2020 were largely reached. It was a great achievement that the 
completion took place much faster than originally expected.120 The greatest successes included 
among others that Siemens managed to increase the customer satisfaction index by 55 % over 
2013121, raised investments in R&D by nearly 40 % compared to 2014122 and had increased the 
profit margin for Industrial Business by 290 basis points since 2013123.  
Regarding the financial results the great majority of businesses were doing very well, including 
several that were outstanding.124 The Building Technologies division posted its all-time best 
year for operations125 and Mobility was the world’s most successful vertically integrated mo-
bility company126. Nevertheless, it was especially the Digital Factory which contributed highly 
to the company’s success (see Exhibit 7).127 As part of Vision 2020, Siemens started early and 
built up eagerly a powerful industry-shaping and fast-growing industrial software business.128 
These efforts payed off as the digital business recorded an extraordinary growth of 80 % in 
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three years129 and outpaced its competitors, growing more than twice as fast130. The Digital 
Factory division was seen as the world-market leader in the field of industrial digitalization.131 
Siemens was the only company in the world that could create complete “digital twins” of prod-
ucts and of all factory processes.132 Kaeser was sure that the Digital Factory would provide 
further growth opportunities in the future as in the digital industrial world there would be a 
“digital twin” for every real thing.133 
In spite of the great achievements, the Power and Gas division was facing major structural 
challenges and a massive shift of investments from conventional fossil power generation to 
renewable sources and distributed energy systems.134 However, Kaeser immediately took steps 
to adapt the business to changed market conditions and make it fit for the future. In the market 
for renewables, Siemens recognized the signs of the times before anyone else and actively 
shaped consolidation.135 The announcement of future changes in the Power and Gas division 
and the associated job cuts caused a decline in share price in the end of 2018.136 Nevertheless, 
compared to the average of competitors the share price was still relatively good. Additionally, 
when the share price development was tracked over a long period, the increase in value achieved 
with Vision 2020 was very clear (see Exhibit 8).137 It was evident, that Kaeser had created a 
company that was more profitable and doing much better than in 2013 (see Exhibit 6).138 As a 
further proof of this achievement, Siemens was voted again as the most respected and admired 
company by the highly regarded Fortune magazine in 2018.139  
 
Looking into the future - Vision 2020+ 
As Siemens was in great shape and Vision 2020 was largely achieved, Kaeser believed it was 
time for the next level. From his point of view, it would have been irresponsible to rest on 
laurels as the world was changing too fast and those who hesitated or stood still would be passed 
by.140 Consequently, on August 2, 2018 Kaeser announced the next-generation Siemens, the 
so-called Vision 2020+, to sustainably shape Siemens’ future. While it was the main goal of 
Vision 2020 to rebuild the old success and to fix underperforming businesses by providing 
strategic direction and strengthening the “inner order” of the company, Vision 2020+ aimed at 
leading Siemens to the excellence.141 As part of it, Siemens would shift from a one-size-fits all 
setup to a purpose-driven and market-focused setup that could readily create and adapt to dis-
ruption, foster consolidation and increase customer-orientation.142 A new company structure 
should provide Siemens’ individual businesses with greater entrepreneurial freedom under the 
strong Siemens brand in order to focus on the respective markets (see Exhibit 3).143 Under the 
changes Siemens was reorganized into three operating companies Gas and Power, Smart 
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Infrastructure and Digital Industries that were managed under the Siemens umbrella, as well as 
three majority-owned strategic companies Siemens Healthineers, Siemens Gamesa Renewable 
Energy and Siemens Alstom.144 Additional three service companies, Financial Services, Global 
Business Services and Real Estate Services should support the six Siemens companies in trans-
actional activities.145 In the future, the company headquarters would be considerably leaner as 
a result of tasks being outsourced. For example, many support and operational functions would 
be allocated to the respective companies to give them full entrepreneurial responsibility and 
accountability.146 Kaeser believed that in 2013 the Siemens businesses were not ready to take 
on more responsibility, but now they were.147 The new structure went into effect on October 1, 
2018 and aimed to be completed by the end of March 2019.148 
Furthermore, Siemens aimed at further looking on growth areas, such as robotics, decentralized 
energies and e-mobility, and expanding the digitalization business to meet the digital revolution 
transforming industry and shape the Fourth Industrial Revolution. It wanted to infrastructurally 
contribute to the megatrends of the world and shape the future, instead of being shaped by the 
future.149 As an early step, with the newly formed Business Unit for IoT Integration Services it 
was Siemens’ goal to provide comprehensive support to customers in their digital transfor-
mation and rigorously expand its market leadership in industrial digitalization.150 Kaeser was 
convinced that it was essential to stay a pioneer and master in the field of industrial digitaliza-
tion to reach the excellence in the future.151 
 
 
Was it the right direction for Siemens?  
 
Having reflected on all the changes he had implemented at Siemens over the last years, Kaeser 
concluded that Siemens had achieved much progress, although the company was still changing 
and the transformation had not been completed.  
In the past Siemens’ competitors were often the trendsetters and Siemens oriented itself on what 
other companies have done, but not anymore. In 2019, people looked at Siemens as a pacesetter 
that defined and shaped the trends in the industrial world, not only in the field of digitalization, 
but also when it came to topics like compliance, profitability as well as the legality and order-
liness of a company.152 Kaeser was positive that with Vision 2020+ Siemens could even become 
stronger in the future.  
However, he was still thinking about the frequently recurring criticism regarding the job cuts at 
Siemens in the last years and whether it was acceptable to cut jobs although a company 
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registered profits in the billions. From his point of view, companies bore social responsibility 
and had the obligation to provide jobs for the community.153 On the other hand, he believed that 
only those firms which operated profitably could secure long-term and sustainable jobs.154 In a 
fast-changing world it was essential to proactively tackle foreseeable structural issues and seek 
long-term solutions in order to be successful.155 As the trend of more automation implied the 
need of less people to do the same amount of work and therefore a shift in jobs, politicians, 
executives and economists should work together to find solutions and support those who were 
affected by the move.156 For Kaeser it was clear: “It won’t be the biggest companies that sur-






Exhibit 1:  
Organizational structure of Siemens since 01/2008  
 
Source: Siemens AG. 2007-2018: Defining digitalization. Retrieved from 
https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/about/history/company/2007-2017.html 
 
Exhibit 2:  
Organizational structure of Siemens since 10/2014 (Vision 2020) 
 






Exhibit 3:  
Organizational structure of Siemens since 10/2018 (Vision 2020+)  
 
 
Source: Siemens AG. (2019). The Company: April 2019. Retrieved from https://www.sie-
mens.com/press/pool/de/homepage/siemens-company-presentation.pdf, p. 39 
 
Exhibit 4:  
Overarching goals Vision 2020 
 
 
Source: Kaeser, J. (2018, February). VISION 2020+ Shaping the future Siemens: Press and Analyst Conference. 
Siemens AG, Munich. Retrieved from https://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2018/corporate/2018-








Exhibit 5:  
Siemens’ expenses on R&D (Fiscal 2014-2018) 
 
 
Source: Annual Reports 2014-2018 
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Source: Annual Reports 2007 – 2018  
 
Exhibit 7:  




i In May 2016 the Healthcare business changed its name to Siemens Healthineers. 
ii In April 2017 Siemens Windpower merged with Gamesa. 
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Exhibit 8:  
Share price development of Siemens in contrast to its main competitors ABB and GE 










Source: Yahoo Finance  
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4 Teaching Notes 
 
4.1. Overview of the Case 
 
This teaching case is about the restructuring of Siemens under the leadership of the current CEO 
Joe Kaeser. It analyses how Kaeser lead Siemens into the digital age and returned the company 
to its former glory by using the company’s dynamic capabilities after it suffered from a series 
of setbacks under the leadership of the former CEO, Peter Loescher. It further shows the effect 
that leadership can have on strategic change and firm performance.  
The first part serves as an introduction to the case. It describes Kaeser’s situation after the an-
nouncement of the new strategic program Vision 2020+ who is questioning his past achieve-
ments as well as the frequently recurring criticism regarding job cuts at Siemens since he be-
came CEO in 2013. The introduction is followed by a short section about the background of 
Siemens.  
The second part focuses on the era of Peter Loescher. It starts with a short description of Lo-
escher as a person and outlines the first years of his tenure, in which he won much praise. The 
newly built up culture of integrity as well as the strategic direction and organizational structure 
under Loescher are covered. The part ends with an illustration of the arising criticism in the 
subsequent years and the resulting dismissal of Loescher in July 2013.  
The third part, which forms the main body of the case, explains the most important changes 
Kaeser has implemented as soon as he had become the new CEO of Siemens. This includes a 
short characterization of Kaeser as well as a description of the new entrepreneurial concept 
Vision 2020 under Kaeser. As part of the description of Vision 2020, the new mission, strategy 
and positioning, organizational structure, culture, as well as the acquisitions, partnerships and 
divestments coming along with it are covered.  
The fourth part is a snapshot of Siemens’ performance in the beginning of November 2018. It 
is followed by an overview of the newly introduced follow-on program on Vision 2020, the so-
called Vision 2020+. The case closes with some thoughts Kaeser has concerning the future and 







4.2. Teaching Objectives  
 
This case is designed to be taught to undergraduate as well as graduate students in the field of 
Business Administration and Management. It is especially suited for courses in the area of Or-
ganizational Behavior, Strategic Management and Leadership.  
After analyzing the case students should be able to:  
- Examine the ability of a major company to rebuild the company’s success after a series 
of setbacks and adapt successfully to ongoing trends  
- Be aware of the importance of constantly sensing environmental changes and trends and 
interpreting them correctly  
- Assess the role of dynamic capabilities for a company’s success  
- Understand how the background and personality of the respective CEO affects the stra-
tegic choices of the company and thus firm performance  
- Investigate the effect of different strategic decisions on firm performance and success 
 
 
4.3. Intended Contribution  
 
The focal contribution is to demonstrate how a major company, was able to restore the com-
pany’s success after it was lagging behind its competitors due to a series of bad managerial 
decisions. It gives an example of a CEO who senses the need for a fundamental strategic reor-
ientation, due to certain internal and external factors, and implements the right changes in order 
to adapt successfully to the trend of digitalization and, consequently, have a positive impact on 
firm performance. Furthermore, the effect the CEO’s background and personality can have on 
strategic change and firm performance are shown and different changes, which can be imple-
mented as part of a strategic renewal, are demonstrated. 
Moreover, the theoretical concept of dynamic capabilities can be applicated to this real-life 
scenario. It is illustrated in particular, how the availability of dynamic capabilities can funda-






4.4. Pedagogical Overview 
 
To be able to efficiently analyze and discuss the teaching case the instructor and the students 
should prepare the case including the assignment questions and some readings in advance. A 
basic knowledge of the students about strategic management, strategic change, firm perfor-
mance and dynamic capabilities is assumed.  
First of all, it is recommended that the instructor and the students read the academic paper 
“Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of Past Research and an Agenda for the Future” (Barreto, 
2010, JM). It provides a review of the different research streams on dynamic capabilities and 
introduces a new framework of dynamic capabilities as a multidimensional construct, that is 
relevant for the case discussion.  
Furthermore, the corporate website of Siemens is a useful source to get additional information 
about Siemens’ businesses as well as strategic orientation. Especially the strategy overview of 
Vision 2020i and the video “Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser on the implementation of Vision 
2020+”ii, that are both available on Siemens’ homepage, are helpful to get a better understand-
ing of the implemented, as well as planned, changes under Kaeser’s leadership. To make the 
lecture more varied, the instructor could also show the video in class. Overall, the company’s 













i Available on https://www.siemens.com/annual/14/en/download/pdf/Siemens_AR2014_Vision2020.pdf  
iiAvailable on https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/about/strategy/overview.html 
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4.5. Assignment Questions and Analysis 
 
Question 1: What challenges did Siemens face? Why did Kaeser see the need to initiate strate-
gic change at Siemens?  
To answer this question external as well as internal factors, that lead to the implementation of 
strategic change at Siemens, can be distinguished.  
 
External factors  
- The unstoppable digitalization trend fundamentally affected and transformed all aspects 
of economy and society.  
- New competitors entered the market. These included especially software companies like 
SAP, Microsoft, IBM as well as players like Google and Apple that expanded its busi-
nesses in areas such as manufacturing and building technologies.  
 
Internal factors  
- Siemens was not in a great shape – neither strategically nor operationally, and neither 
from the point of view of business leadership. It especially lacked a long-term vision.  
- Siemens was lagging behind its competitors, namely in profitability, growth and inno-
vativeness. Siemens’ competitors were the trendsetters and defined the trends in the 
industrial world. In contrast, Siemens oriented itself on what others had done and did 
not play an important role in shaping technological trends.  
- Siemens did not live up to its economic potential and missed the profit margin target 
under Peter Loescher’s leadership. 
- The series of bad managerial decisions under Loescher’s leadership had caused a situa-
tion of unrest in the company. 
 
Overall, Siemens faced the challenge that the world was becoming increasingly digitalized and 
connected and that it could not keep up with its competitors with respect to profitability and 
innovative capacity. For Kaeser it was clear, that in the future it was essential to focus on the 
megatrend of digitalization in order to be successful, as he saw digitalization as the key driver 
for industrial growth.  
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Question 2: Analyze Siemens at the time of Kaeser’s tenure by applying Barreto’s framework 
of dynamic capabilities to the case.  
Regarding this question it is expected that students analyze and evaluate each dynamic capabil-
ity propensity individually in the context of Siemens’ strategic transformation under Kaeser. 
 
Propensity to sense 
opportunities and 
threats 
- Siemens sensed the threat of new competitors entering the market 
and of lagging behind in innovation, profitability as well as growth. 
- Siemens sensed megatrends such as the digitalization as an oppor-
tunity to create more value for the customers. 
- Siemens sensed the threat of a major shift in investments from con-
ventional fossil power generation to renewable sources and distrib-
uted energy systems in the Power and Gas division. 
→ high propensity to sense opportunities and threats  
Propensity to make 
timely decisions  
- Siemens was the first company to bundle all the requirements for 
the factory of the digital future under one roof. 
- Siemens immediately took steps to adapt the Power and Gas busi-
ness to changed market conditions. It was the first company to ob-
serve the signs of the times in the market for renewables and could 
therefore actively shape consolidation. 
→ high propensity to make timely decisions  
Propensity to make 
market-oriented 
decisions  
- Siemens focused on the megatrends of urbanization, globalization, 
digitalization as well as demographic and climate change. It was 
Kaeser’s aim to continuously tap new promising fields and look on 
growth areas.  
- Especially the introduction of the Digital Factory division and the 
expansion of the digital business turned out to be a great success as 
the digitalization trend affected all aspects of the economy and so-
ciety.  





change the          
resource base  
Reconfigure resources 
- The foundation of next47, a separate unit for startups, to foster in-
novation and accelerate the development of new ideas 
- Changes in the organizational structure of Siemens as part of Vi-
sion 2020 and Vision 2020+ 
- Changes in the workforce structure as Siemens started to increas-
ingly hire software specialists instead of engineers and physicists 
in the development department 
 
Releasing resources  
- Divestment of businesses that yield few or no synergies for the 
company such as the audiology business and BSH Bosch and Sie-
mens Hausgeräte  
- Reduction of jobs  
 
Gaining resources 
- Acquisitions of businesses such as Rolls-Royce’s aero-derivative 
gas turbine business, Dresser Rand as well as software specialists 
like Mentor Graphics, J2 Innovations and Mendix to sharpen the 
business focus 
- Partnership with IBM to broaden its digital capabilities  
→ high propensity to change the resource base 
 
Overall, students should understand that under Kaeser’s leadership Siemens was able to reach 
a high propensity in all four dimensions of Barreto’s framework of dynamic capabilities which 
resulted in a successful adjustment to the new environmental conditions and an improvement 









Question 3: Taking into account the last two CEOs of Siemens, evaluate how each one’s per-
sonality and background affected the strategic choices of Siemens and thus the company’s per-
formance. 
With this question, students should elaborate on the effect the background and personality of 
the respective CEO can have on strategic change.  
 
 Peter Loescher Joe Kaeser 
CEO Origin 
First outside CEO of Siemens and 
largely unknown in Germany prior to 
his tenure at the company  
Inside CEO who joined Siemens in 
1980 and has never worked for a dif-
ferent company  
This background helped Loescher to 
succeed in guiding Siemens through 
the challenges of the corruption scan-
dal as a CEO who was totally clean 
was essential to root-out bribery at 
Siemens. However, after winning 
much praise in the early part of his 
tenure criticism mounted in the later 
years. Loescher was good at trim-
ming down the company and boost-
ing efficiency in the short-term, but 
he lacked to define a long-term vi-
sion for Siemens. Furthermore, Lo-
escher made a series of bad manage-
rial decisions during his tenure that 
might have been the consequence of 
a lacking understanding of Siemens’ 
culture and existing capabilities due 
to his origin. 
Kaeser was seen as having a deep un-
derstanding of Siemens’ business 
and culture because of his origin. He 
implemented strategic changes at 
Siemens that built upon existing or-
ganizational capabilities and bene-
fited firm performance in a continu-
ous way. Kaeser succeeded in build-
ing and sustaining long-term growth 
instead of focusing on the short-term.  
Educational 
Background 
Degree in business administration 
and economics 
Degree in business administration 
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The business background of both CEOs might be the reason that Loescher 
as well as Kaeser placed much value on capital markets during their tenure.  
Personality 
Characterized as mostly stiff and    
little humorous 
Characterized as a hands-on pragma-
tist who is entertaining and ironically 
looking at himself 
This personality traits could have 
further aggravated Loescher’s ability 
to connect to Siemens and to the 
overall workforce during his time as 
CEO. 
Kaeser’s personality might have 
helped him to build up good relation-
ships with investors, the capital mar-
ket and people in general.  
 
Students should understand that the personality and especially the background of the individual 
CEOs largely affected their strategic choices at Siemens and, consequently, the firm perfor-
mance. While Loescher as an outside CEO performed very well in the early part of his tenure 
by guiding Siemens through the challenges of the bribery scandal and boosting efficiency, his 
success broke in to a great extent in the latter part, as he lacked to define a long-term vision for 
Siemens and made decisions that turned out to be a mistake. In contrast, Kaeser as an inside 
CEO initiated strategic changes that benefited firm performance in a relatively incremental but 
















Question 4: In your opinion, is it acceptable that Siemens cut a large amount of jobs under 
Kaeser’s leadership although the company registered profits in the billions?  
The purpose of this question is that students learn to build an opinion based on what they have 
studied and share it with their fellow students. A discussion of the question will further deepen 
their understanding of the case and the taught topic. 
Possible arguments that can be put forward by the students as part of a discussion are that on 
the one hand Siemens might have social responsibility for its employees and as a major engine 
of the economy the obligation to provide jobs to the community.  
On the other hand, restructures were inevitable at Siemens in order restore the company’s suc-
cess and increase its competitiveness. Adaptation, that also implied changes in the workforce 
strategy, played a key role in the economic recovery of Siemens. As Kaeser said: “Only those 
who operate profitably can secure long-term and sustainable jobs.” Under his leadership Sie-
mens was aiming at increasing the total market value rather than focusing on the short-term 
impact of the taken measures. Consequently, according to his strategy Kaeser performed better 
by cutting jobs in order to assure the survival of the company.  
Further topics that could be included in the discussion by the instructor are whether students 
see alternatives to layoffs and how the problem of the increasing automation trend and the re-
sulting need of less workers could be solved in the future. 
 
 
4.6. Board Plan 
 
The case is designed for a 90-minute lecture. The following table shows the proposed activities 
and the duration of each task.  
 
Activity  Time (min) 
Theoretical Review  15 
Siemens Case Review 10 
Question 1 10 
Question 2 20 
Question 3 15 
Question 4 10 





The results of this thesis support the importance of strategic change within a company in order 
to restore success and maintain the company’s viability in the long-term. Furthermore, they 
exemplify the effect of leadership on strategic change, and thus on firm performance. The Sie-
mens case shows a real-life example of a strategic transformation of a major company and the 
implementation of possible changes to adapt to changing environments. It also illustrates the 
role of dynamic capabilities for a company’s success. 
According to the definition of strategic change by Snow and Hambrick (1980), Siemens defi-
nitely underwent strategic change under Kaeser’s leadership. Kaeser did not only adapt to the 
changing environmental conditions, but also implemented changes in the technology, structure 
and processes to come up with an overall strategic transformation. The Siemens case is also in 
line with Gioia and Chittipeddi’s (1991) view on strategic change, as in addition to changes in 
the mode of acting, Kaeser made alterations in the way of thinking by introducing a culture of 
ownership and a new mission at Siemens.  
Regarding the reason for strategic change, the case supports the findings of Boeker (1997) and 
Mintzberg (1978), which identified poor performance as a main initiator for strategic change. 
When Kaeser became CEO of Siemens in 2013, Siemens was not in great shape signaling Kae-
ser that the existing strategy did not meet the requirements of the environment and therefore 
strategic change was necessary. 
Moreover, several authors in the literature (Day & Lord, 1988; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Hambrick, 1989; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981) emphasize the impact leadership has on strategic 
change and firm performance, that can also be underlined by the Siemens case. Both CEOs, 
Loescher first and then Kaeser, set the strategic direction for the organization and made mana-
gerial decisions that highly affected firm performance. However, it has to be considered that it 
is not only the CEO who has an effect on strategic change and thus firm performance as for a 
successful implementation of strategic change the CEO heavily relies on the company’s stake-
holders, most notably the firm’s employees as they are seen as one of the company’s greatest 
assets. Therefore, it is impossible that the CEO implements strategic change on his own. How-
ever, managers often face resistance to change by their employees as they fear moving from the 
known to the unknown and prefer to keep the status quo. In this case, the CEO especially de-
pends on other managers, including the lower management, to pass on core values and make 
the motives and necessity for change explicit to every single employee. 
39 
 
Furthermore, the case confirms the findings of Miller (1993) who argues that CEO succession 
is associated with organizational change. After being announced as CEO, Loescher as well as 
Kaeser implemented major organizational changes at Siemens. This, however, contradicts 
Boeker’s (1997) theory of no significant effect of CEO succession on strategic change.  
Concerning the impact of the CEO origin on strategic change, the case of Siemens is not in line 
with the findings of Greiner and Bhambri (1989) that especially CEOs coming from outside the 
company are the ones who initiate change and define the new direction. Kaeser who introduced 
a new entrepreneurial program and implemented major strategic change at Siemens, was hired 
from inside the company and has never worked for a different company. On the other hand, it 
confirms the study of Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) who argue that a CEO hired from inside 
the firm in contrast to an outside CEO is more likely to implement strategic change that is in 
line with the existing capabilities. While Loescher as an outside CEO was good at trimming 
down the company in the short-term, he lacked to define a long-term vision for Siemens. In 
contrast, Kaeser who was hired from inside the firm succeeded in building long-term growth 
and therefore had a more continuous and positive effect on firm performance. However, it has 
to be taken into account that the origin of Loescher was an important requirement for success-
fully rooting-out bribery at Siemens in the beginning of his tenure.  
With respect to the dynamic capabilities view, the Siemens case seeks to illustrate the im-
portance of each dimension defined by Barreto (2010) as part of his concept on dynamic capa-
bilities. By applying Barreto’s (2010) framework to the Siemens case, it becomes clear that 
under Kaeser’s leadership Siemens was able to reach a high propensity in all four dimensions, 
namely the propensity to sense opportunities and threats, the propensity to make timely deci-
sions, the propensity to make market-oriented decisions as well as the propensity to change its 
resource base, which resulted in a successful adjustment to the new environmental conditions 
and an improvement in performance.  
Teece et al. (1997), as the first scholars who introduced the concept of dynamic capabilities, 
argue that dynamic capabilities are only relevant in highly dynamic markets in contrast to en-
vironments characterized by lower rates of change. Siemens is in fact operating in an industry 
that is highly dynamic, being affected by digitalization and therefore characterized by advanc-
ing and changing technologies. 
The Siemens case further supports Zollo and Winter’s (2002) definition of dynamic capabilities 
as structured, stable and persistent decisions in contrast to being a disjointed way to respond to 
crisis. Under Kaeser’s leadership Siemens showed its ongoing effort, to sharpen the business 
focus and continuously tap new promising fields. The Siemens case illustrates the importance 
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of recognizing opportunities and threats as well as environmental changes on a continuous basis 
and not just in response to a decline in performance in order to be successful in the long-term. 
 
However, there are some limitations regarding the analysis of the CEO’s effect on strategic 
change as well as the role of dynamic capabilities for a company’s success. First of all, the 
effect of some of the implemented changes at Siemens might not be apparent in the short-term 
as the full implementation and integration of changes is typically a lengthy process. Conse-
quently, the final impact of the initiated changes on Siemens’ performance might only become 
more visible in the long-term.  
In addition, some implemented changes might look successful after the first five years, but an 
exogenous shock could change the perspective on the outcome. In a fast-changing world shifts 
in the environmental conditions are rather unpredictable and may render current strategies in-
effective.  
Furthermore, the effect of the CEO on strategic change was evaluated by only using qualitative 
research instead of quantitative measurements such as in form of a survey. This might cause a 
restricted objectivity of the effect of Siemens’ CEOs on strategic change and thus firm perfor-
mance.  
Concerning the dynamic capabilities view, it is a major limitation that so far, no quantitative 
framework for the analysis of dynamic capabilities exists in the literature. This lack of quanti-
tative framework hampers the precision of the evaluation. On account of this, the quantitative 
measurement of dynamic capabilities should be addressed in future research. 
Another aspect future literature could include is whether the results of this dissertation also 
apply to smaller companies. Siemens as a major company is characterized by strong financial 
and R&D capabilities that might make it easier to adapt to changing environmental conditions 





Overall, literature has shown that adaptation to the continuous changing environment and thus 
strategic change are crucial for a firm’s survival and success. In recent years especially the 
dynamic capabilities view has gained increasing attention in explaining how a company can 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage in changing environments. Moreover, scholars have 
investigated the impact the CEO can have on strategic change and thus firm performance. As 
the top executive the CEO formulates the corporate strategy and determines the strategic direc-
tion of a firm. Scholars found out that the content and direction of the strategy the CEO takes 
is generally affected by previous experiences as well as the CEO’s personal background. 
To support the existing theories with a real-life example, I selected the case of the restructuring 
of Siemens under the leadership of its current CEO, Joe Kaeser. The case intends to demonstrate 
a strategic renewal of a major company in response to changed environmental conditions. Kae-
ser fundamentally reorganized Siemens and implemented major changes, not only in the com-
pany’s strategy, but also the mission, culture and organizational structure. He used in particular 
the digitalization trend to boost performance and restore success after a series of setbacks under 
the leadership of Siemens’ former CEO, Peter Loescher. The transformation of Siemens under 
Kaeser’s leadership is an example of a positive effect the CEO can have on strategic change 
and the resulting performance. Through the case analysis it becomes clear, how the experience 
and personal background of the different CEOs, Kaeser and Loescher, affected their respective 
strategic decisions and thus Siemens’s performance. Furthermore, the case exemplifies how the 
disposability of dynamic capabilities at Siemens contributed to the company’s success. Under 
Kaeser’s leadership Siemens was able to sense opportunities and threats, make timely and mar-
ket-oriented decisions as well as change the resource base at the same time.  
The main conclusions of this thesis are that the CEO indeed can have a great effect on strategic 
change and the resulting performance, in the case of Kaeser even a positive one. However, 
different types of leaders are required for different challenges. While Loescher as an outside 
CEO lacked to define a long-term vision, his background and origin were beneficial for clean-
ing-up the company after the bribery scandal. 
Furthermore, it has become clear to me that dynamic capabilities are crucial for achieving a 
sustainable competitive advantage and that managers must pay attention to all four dimensions 
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